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COMMENT
RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TO WHAT?
HOW LAWRENCE V. TEXAS DESTROYED OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A
LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST
Matthew J. Clark'
I. INTRODUCTION
Exactly what is a legitimate state interest? Any lawyer or law student who
has been through a constitutional law course is familiar with the phrase
"legitimate state interest." It appears whenever a court conducts a rational
basis review.' Under that standard of review, a court is supposed to uphold
a law so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.2 Most of
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1. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 46 (3d ed.
2009).
2. Id. In a 2004 case, the Supreme Court said that the modern-day rational basis test
was established in M'Culloch v. Maryland, in which Chief Justice Marshall first interpreted
the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I § 8 of the Federal Constitution. Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004). Justice Thomas concurred but thought that the M'Culloch
test was more sophisticated than the modern-day rational basis test and required a slightly
higher level of review than mere rationality. Id. at 611-13 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment). Justice Thomas's belief appears to be well-founded. Compare M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.") with MASSEY, supra note 1, at 46 (stating the modern view that a law will
be upheld unless the challenger can prove that the law is "not rationally related to a
legitimate government objective."). Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court has long used
the rational basis test and does not appear to be ready to reconsider it, this Comment
assumes the rational basis test is valid.
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the time, a rational basis review will focus on whether the connection
between the statute and purported government interest is rational.' One
commentator observed that a law must be "truly bizarre" to fail this test.4
Nevertheless, sometimes the issue is not whether the connection between
the law and the purported government interest is rational, but whether the
end-or the purported government interest-is legitimate.s Courts will
sometimes declare that the end is illegitimate.' But often when this occurs,
the court's declaration that the purported interest is illegitimate is nothing
more than a conclusory statement with little legal analysis.' Perhaps the
courts think that the meaning of "legitimate state interest" is so obvious that
a lengthy legal analysis is not required because most individuals should
know what the government can and cannot legitimately do. But in today's
increasingly pluralistic society, with so many different views of the state's
role, it is no longer safe to assume that the standard for determining the
legitimacy of the state's interests is a given.
For a long time, however, our country was unified by a standard for
knowing whether the state's actions were legitimate-that standard was the
law of nature.' This law of nature, according to the common law and the
Founders, was knowable through three sources-reason, the conscience,
and the Scriptures.' The legitimacy of the government's interests was
further restricted by written constitutions.10 Thus, if a purported
government interest violated either the law of nature or the Constitution,
then the state's interest was illegitimate." A series of Supreme Court cases
in the early to mid twentieth century removed reason and the Scriptures as
3. MASSEY, supra note 1, at 46.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. E.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("For if the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.").
7. See, e.g., id.; cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("The State of Connecticut does have statutes, the constitutionality of which is
beyond doubt, which prohibit adultery and fornication.") (emphasis added). This footnote
does not seek to comment on particular holdings, but rather to show that courts sometimes
jump to conclusions without much legal analysis.
8. See infra Part IIA-B.
9. See infra Part II.A-B.
10. See infra Part HI.B.
11. See infra Part II.B.
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a means for knowing the law of nature, leaving only the conscience for
knowing whether the state's interests were legitimate.
In 2003, the Supreme Court held, in Lawrence v. Texas,13 that state laws
prohibiting homosexual sodomy were unconstitutional.14 In its analysis, the
Court appears to have assumed that protecting morality is not a legitimate
state interest." The effect of this holding is to remove the last means of
knowing the law of nature because the conscience no longer has a place in
determining the legitimacy of the state's interests. 6
Notwithstanding this effect of the Lawrence Court's decision, the rational
basis test remains the same. Courts still must determine whether a
purported state interest is legitimate, but now they have no standard to
guide their judgment. This means that judges will incorporate their own
personal views into the law, and consequently, a legitimate state interest will
be whatever the judges say. This is a problem because the power to declare
whether a purported government interest is legitimate is the power to say,
as a philosophical matter, what the government can and cannot do.
Subjecting this power to ipse dixit" is unacceptable, and this problem
demands a solution.
This Comment proposes a test for when a purported government interest
is challenged as illegitimate. First, if neither a fundamental right nor a
suspect class is targeted, then the burden should be on the challenger to
prove that the purported government interest is illegitimate. In considering
whether the purported interest is legitimate, the Court should consider
whether it is a legitimate power that the government can exercise under the
law of nature and whether it is a legitimate power that the government can
exercise under the Constitution. In considering whether the interest is
illegitimate under the law of nature, judges may consider evidence from
reason, morality, and the Scriptures. If the purported interest does not
contradict the law of nature or the federal (and state, if a state law)
constitution(s), then the interest is legitimate, and the law should be struck
down only if it is not rationally related to that legitimate state interest.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14. See infra Part II.D.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See infra Part II.D.
17. Ipse dixit is a Latin phrase; literally, "[H]e himself said it," meaning, "Something
asserted but not proved[.]" BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 905 (9th ed. 2009). In other words,
when something is law just because a court says so, it is an ipse dixit.
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This Comment's discussion of Lawrence does not discuss the issue of gay
rights, Lawrence's societal consequences, or whether the use of the rational
basis test in Lawrence was proper, since those subjects have already been
discussed extensively.' Instead, this Comment focuses on how Lawrence
destroyed the standard for determining whether something is a legitimate
state interest and left a void that judges now are free to fill with their own
theories. Furthermore, although the rational basis test currently determines
whether a law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, no test exists
to determine whether a purported state interest is legitimate, which this
Comment proposes.
This Comment begins by discussing the common law and early
American standard for determining whether something was a legitimate
state interest and concludes that the standard was based on the law of
nature, which was knowable through reason, the conscience, and the
Scriptures. In the same section, this Comment explores how twentieth-
century Supreme Court cases deviated from the law of nature standard and
completely abandoned that standard in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas. Next,
this Comment explores the effect of Lawrence on the lower courts, which
left them without a standard to determine whether something is a legitimate
state interest and ultimately allowed judges to use their own theories to
determine whether something is a legitimate state interest. This Comment
also briefly explores various theories that could become the new standard
for assessing whether a purported state interest is legitimate. Finally, this
Comment proposes that the Court reverse Lawrence and other cases that
rejected the law of nature standard, proposes a test for when a purported
state interest is challenged as illegitimate in a rational basis review, and
provides examples of how this analysis would work.
18. See, e.g., Susan Austin Blazier, The Irrational Use of Rational Basis in Lawrence v.
Texas: Implications for Our Society, 26 CAMPBELL L. REv. 21 (2004) (discussing whether the
rational basis test was correctly applied in Lawrence); Sarah Catherine Mowchan, A Supreme
Court That Is "Willing to Start Down That Road": The Slippery Slope of Lawrence v. Texas, 17
REGENT U. L. REv. 125, 126 (2004) (discussing the societal implications of overruling Bowers
v. Hardwick); Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1635-
36, 1639 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence actually hurts gay rights).
418 [ Vol. 6:415
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II. BACKGROUND: THE FOUNDERS' STANDARD AND ITS DEMISE
A. The Common Law Standard for Determining the Legitimacy of State
Interests
As the Magna Carta demonstrates, the Anglo-American tradition has
always recognized that the civil government has limits." But this view
inevitably presents a problem. If the civil government is sovereign yet
limited, then society must have an objective standard for limiting the
government's authority. In other words, if one says that government is
limited, then one needs to have an objective standard that provides a basis
for telling the government what it can and cannot do.
Sir Edward Coke, one of England's most respected jurists, explained the
basis for limiting the government's authority in his Reports.20 Coke
explained that the common law of England assumed that there was a law
that preexisted the Crown and the courts.2 1 Coke called that law the law of
nature.22 To Coke, there were four key principles about the law of nature:
first, it commanded loyalty of the subject to the king; second, it was part of
the law of England; third, it existed before any judicial or municipal
authority; and fourth, it was immutable.23 According to Coke, "The law of
nature is that which God at the time of creation of the nature of man
infused into his heart, for his preservation and direction; and this is lex
aeterna, the moral law, called also the law of nature."2 4 Coke also noted that
because this law preceded civil authorities, it was the standard by which
kings administered justice before any written law existed.25 For this reason,
19. See, e.g., MAGNA CARTA § 1, available at http://www.britannia.com/history/docs/
magna2.html (guaranteeing "that the English Church shall be free").
20. Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 391-92 (K.B. 1608).
21. Id. at 392.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 391-92.
24. Id. at 392.
25. Id.
This law of nature, which indeed is the eternal law of the Creator, infused into
the heart of the creature at the time of his creation, was two thousand years
before any laws written, and before any judicial or municipal laws. And certain
it is, that before judicial or municipal laws were made, Kings did decide causes
according to natural equity, and were not tied to any rule or formality of law,
but did dare jura.
Id.
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Coke said that courts had the authority to void acts of Parliament if they
were contrary to the common law, which included the law of nature.26
This view of the law of nature continued as the common law developed.
Sir William Blackstone 27 discussed the common law in his work,
Commentaries on the Laws of England.28 Like Coke, Blackstone explained
the basis for law and civil authority. "[W]hen the Supreme Being formed
the universe," Blackstone wrote, "and created matter out of nothing, he
impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never
depart, and without which it would cease to be.. . . This will of [man's]
Maker is called the law of nature."29 Blackstone believed that God endowed
man with the faculty of reason to be able to discover this law.30
Nevertheless, Blackstone also believed that because man's reason is
imperfect and corrupt, God "hath been pleased . . . [to communicate His
laws] by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered
we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy
scriptures."" Blackstone argued that the precepts found in the Scriptures
were also part of the original law of nature.3 2 Blackstone viewed this law as
the basis for limiting the government's authority. He wrote, "Upon these
two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all
human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict
these."" Blackstone also wrote that if human law compelled us to transgress
the law of nature, then we would be bound to disobey the human law and
obey the divine law.34
In sum, according to the common law, the basis for evaluating the state's
interests was the law of nature. According to Coke and Blackstone, there
were three ways of knowing that law: the infusion of the law on the heart
26. Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 297,319 (2010) (discussing Coke's analysis in Dr. Bonham's Case).
27. Blackstone was the most frequently cited source by the Founders, other than the
Bible and Montesquieu, respectively. DONALD LuTz, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 140-42 (1988). Thus, Blackstone's understanding of the law of nature
should be given great weight in interpreting how the Founders understood the law of nature.
28. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
29. Id. at *38-39.
30. Id. at *41.
31. Id. at *41-42.
32. Id. at *42.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *42-43.
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(the "conscience")," observation of creation through reason ("reason"), and
the Holy Scriptures ("Scriptures"). 6 This Comment will repeatedly refer
back to this framework, so it is important to keep it in mind.
B. The Early American Standard for Determining the Legitimacy of State
Interests
The British tradition of using the law of nature to determine the
legitimacy of government interests was brought to the British Colonies,
which eventually became the United States. When the colonies rebelled
against England, the colonies explained their basis for rebelling in the
Declaration of Independence (the "Declaration").17 If there were no higher
standard than the government to evaluate the government's actions, then
the colonies would have had no legitimate reason to assert that the actions
35. Some readers may be familiar with the sociological jurisprudence of Lord Patrick
Devlin, who believed that law is based on morals, but that morals are whatever the people say
they are. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 7, 22-23 (1965) (arguing that
because the people are free to reject Christianity they are free to reject Christian morals, and
thus morality is whatever "sense of right and wrong which resides in the community as a
whole[.]"). The Anglo-American tradition, however, does not endorse that view. Thus, the
term "conscience" in this Comment neither refers to the subjective, collective conscience of
the people nor to the subjective conscience of a judge, but rather presumes that the
conscience is a God-given means of knowing an objective, transcendent standard. See infra
Part IV.A.
36. Interestingly, the Bible establishes the same framework. First, Romans 1:18-20 states
that God's truth is self-evident to man through what has been seen.
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and
unrighteousness of men who suppress the truth in unrighteousness, because
that which is known about God is evident within them. For since the creation
of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have
been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they
are without excuse.
Romans 1:18-20 (New American Standard) (emphasis added). Second, Romans 2:14-15 says
that God's truth is written on man's heart and calls it the conscience.
For when Gentiles who do not have the Law do instinctively the things of the
Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves, in that they show the
work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness and
their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them[.]
Romans 2:14-15 (New American Standard) (emphasis added). Finally, 2 Timothy
3:16 states that Scripture is given by God for the same purposes. "All Scripture is
inspired by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for
training in righteousness[.]" 2 Timothy 3:16 (New American Standard).
37. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
2012]1 421
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of the Crown were illegal. Nevertheless, the Continental Congress asserted
that when a government treats its people the way that the Crown did, "it
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have
connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the
earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them. . . ."3
The Declaration continues with the law of nature rhetoric, saying,
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."
The standard of the Founders is evident by that statement. The Founders
believed that the law of nature vested people with rights, required
governments to be formed to secure those rights, and required the
government's powers to be derived from the consent of the governed.' The
Declaration also says that the people have the right to abolish their
government if it becomes destructive of those ends." Nevertheless, this
inevitably raises the question: what gives the people the right to throw off
that government? The first paragraph of the Declaration goes back to the
law of nature as the standard for determining that right.42 It is evident, then,
that the law of nature is the standard by which the Founders assessed what
constitutes a legitimate state interest.
Perhaps the boldest and clearest assertion of the law of nature as the
standard for assessing legitimate state interests came from Justice Joseph
Story, who wrote, "One of the beautiful boasts of our municipal
jurisprudence is, that Christianity is a part of the common law . . .. There
38. Id. at para. 1 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at para. 2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at para. 1.
422 [Vol. 6:415
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never has been a period, in which the common law did not recognise
Christianity as lying at its foundations."4 Addressing the law of nature issue
specifically, Justice Story said, "Christianity becomes, not merely an
auxiliary, but a guide to the law of nature, establishing its conclusions,
removing its doubts, and elevating its precepts."' Justice Story's position
was consistent with Blackstone's-each believed that using the Scriptures
was epistemologically superior to deducing the law of nature through
reason alone.
Justice Story continued by describing how the law of nature determined
the legitimacy of the state's interests. He first said that the God-given law of
nature "consider[s] [man] in the various relations of life, in which he may
be placed, and ascertains in each his obligations and duties."' The law of
nature considers man in various situations, including "as a solitary being, as
a member of a family, as a parent, and lastly as a member of the
commonwealth."" In the very next sentence, Justice Story said:
The consideration of this last relation [man as a member of
a commonwealth] introduces us at once to the most interesting
and important topics; the nature, objects, and end of government;
the institution of marriage; the origins of the rights of property;
the nature and limits of social liberty; the structure of civil and
political rights; the authority of policy laws; and indeed all those
institutions, which form the defence and the ornament of
civilized society."
43. JOSEPH STORY, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED UPON THE INAUGURATION OF THE AUTHOR
AS DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH DAY OF
AUGUST, 1829, at 20-21 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, Little, and Wilkins 1829). Justice Story did,
however, note that the flaw in the common law system was that it only respected Christianity
"as taught by its own church." Id. at 21. Thus the church was allowed to tell the state to
punish unbelief, which Justice Story said was a power that "belong[ed] exclusively to God."
Id. Nevertheless, he said, "But apart from this defect, the morals of the law are of the purest
and most irreproachable character." Id.
44. Id. at 44.
45. Id. It is worth noting, however, that Justice Story did not reject deducing morality
through reason. Id. He also made a connection between happiness and virtue that cannot be
dissolved. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
2012] 423
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Justice Story began with the law of nature and argued that it defined man's
obligations and duties as a member of society, which gave rise to "the
nature, objects, and end of government." 9 Justice Story could not have
stated his position more clearly.s For him, as it was for the Founders and
the great English jurists before them, the law of nature was the standard that
determined what government could and could not do." In other words, the
law of nature determined what constituted a legitimate state interest.
During the early republic, the federal judiciary did not have to concern
itself with determining how the law of nature applied. The federal
government was established by a written constitution, which gave only
certain, limited powers to the newly-formed government.5 2 Whichever
powers were not granted to the federal government, nor prohibited to the
states, were reserved to the states or to the people." Because of this
framework, the Court dealt mainly with federal issues, and therefore did not
have to assess whether state actions were legitimate state interests by the law
of nature standard.' In fact, many of the Court's cases involving federal law
dealt with how state law comported with the Federal Constitution."
The Fourteenth Amendment changed the structure of the early republic
and gave the federal government broader power to review state laws.
Consequently, the federal judiciary began to strike down state laws under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra Part II.
52. The Supreme Court did, however, have to wrestle with issues of how the law of
nature affected the powers of the new Constitution, especially in Marbury v. Madison.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a detailed analysis, see See Tuomala,
supra note 26.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
54. Id. This flows logically out of the Tenth Amendment. If all the other rights, which
are vested by the law of nature, are reserved to the people or the states, then the people or the
states would be responsible for deciding law of nature issues, not the federal government.
55. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (declaring that
state and federal governments have concurrent power to regulate interstate commerce);
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (discussing the difference
between federal power to regulate interstate commerce and state police powers that
incidentally affect interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)
(discussing the nature and power of the Commerce Clause and how it relates to state
actions).
56. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
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Amendment." The strict scrutiny," intermediate scrutiny," and rational
basis' tests under the Fourteenth Amendment gave the federal judiciary the
opportunity to consider what limits were placed on state laws that were not
expressly prohibited to the states by the Constitution."1 The question, then,
was this: what standard would the Court use to determine what limits were
placed on state laws? In other words, what standard would the Court use to
determine whether the state's interests were legitimate?"
57. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954) (striking down various laws
requiring segregated education under the Equal Protection Clause); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (holding that the Due Process Clause has absorbed certain rights
under the belief that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed"); Chi.,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (ruling that the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause).
58. Strict scrutiny is triggered when a government action is presumptively invalid
(usually when a fundamental right is being abridged) and requires the government interest
to be compelling and the means narrowly tailored in order to survive. See MASSEY, supra note
1, at 46. For a discussion of fundamental rights, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720-21 (1997) ("[T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' . . . and
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed[.]') (citations omitted).
59. Intermediate scrutiny is triggered "when the government action comes with some
taint of presumptive invalidity but not quite enough to invoke strict scrutiny." MASSEY, supra
note 1, at 47.
60. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("[lIf a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears
a rational relation to some legitimate end.").
61. Cf supra note 53.
62. One scholar attempted to define the standard for determining whether something
was a legitimate state interest by saying that a purported interest is legitimate if it is "within
the granted powers of the government in question and not violative of some constitutional
restraint on the exercise of those powers[.]" MASSEY, supra note 1. There are two problems
with this view. First, the requirement that the end be legitimate first appeared in Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in M'Cullough ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.") M'Cullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). If "legitimate"
meant "within the granted powers of the government," then Chief Justice Marshall's next
phrase "let it be within the scope of the constitution" would be redundant. The standard that
Chief Justice Marshall was referring to was the law of nature. See Tuomala, supra note 26, at
305-07 (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall's jurisprudence was based on the Declaration of
Independence, which was based on the law of nature). Second, the Court already uses
extraconstitutional standards in reviewing state actions under the Fourteenth Amendment
2012] 425
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C. The Demise of Using the Law of Nature for Determining the Legitimacy
of State Interests
According to Coke, Blackstone, the Founders, and Justice Story, the law
of nature, which was the basis for determining whether the state's interests
were legitimate, was accessible to man by three means: observation of
creation through reason, the Scriptures, and the conscience.63
In Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court barred
observation of creation through reason as a means of assessing the
legitimacy of the state's interests.' The issue in Erie was whether federal
courts should apply state supreme court decisions or "general principles of
law," which had been called "federal common law," in federal diversity
cases.6 1 Prior to Erie, Justice Story's analysis from Swift v. Tyson' was
controlling.67 In Swift, Justice Story held that there were general principles
of law that the courts were bound to respect.' Nevertheless, Erie overruled
Swift6' and replaced the general principles of law, or those law-of-nature
that are not derived from the plain text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. See, e.g., Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (holding that the Due Process Clause has absorbed
certain rights under the belief that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed"). This author's view is that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses were intended to place some law-of-nature limitations on the states. See
Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and
the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 346-47 (2011) (discussing
the views of John Bingham and his fellow Republicans); David Smolin, Equal Protection, in
THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 401 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005)
(discussing the link between the Equal Protection Clause and the Declaration of
Independence). Thus, whether the Court uses its modern-day Due Process analysis or
follows the original intent by using the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court still faces
the problem of needing to use an extraconstitutional source (or rather preconstitutional
source) to review state laws in certain situations.
63. See supra Part II.A-B.
64. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938). Erie expressly rejected the
proposition that there was any "transcendental body of law outside of any particular State[.]"
Id. at 79. According to the Erie Court, "[t]he authority and only authority is the State[.]" Id.
One commentator observed that by rejecting Swift, the Court broke with the Anglo-
American tradition "dating back at least to Bracton," making "a radical declaration that law
does not pertain primarily to reason, but rather to will." Tuomala, supra note 26, at 324.
65. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
66. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
67. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
68. Swift, 41 U.S. at 17.
69. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
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principles accessible by reason, with judges' opinions. 0 This was essentially
a rejection of what the Declaration called self-evident truths, which was a
major blow to the nation's jurisprudence-moving away from using
transcendent law and towards using legal positivism to determine what the
state can do."
Shortly after Erie, the Court developed a doctrine that separated religion
from politics, which would ultimately preclude using the Scriptures to
determine the legitimacy of government interests.7 ' This began with Everson
v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, where the Court held that the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause erected a wall of separation
between church and state.7 ' Nevertheless, the effect of Everson and its
progeny has not been to separate the institutions of church and state, but
rather to separate religion from politics.74 While no case since Everson has
addressed using the Scriptures as a legal standard specifically, if a teacher-
led prayer in a public school violates the Establishment Clause, 7 then surely
a judge using a Bible to determine a legal standard would as well. 6
70. Id. at 78-79.
71. Accord Tuomala, supra note 26, at 323-34.
72. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
73. Id. at 18.
74. Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Mythical "Wall of Separation": How a Misused Metaphor
Changed Church-State Law, Policy, and Discourse, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 23,
2006), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/06/The-Mythical-Wall-of-Separation
-How-a-Misused-Metaphor-Changed-Church-State-Law-Policy-and-Discourse ("Whereas
Jefferson's wall expressly separated the institutions of church and state, the Court's wall,
more expansively, separates religion and all civil government.").
75. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,424 (1962).
76. Interestingly, Justice Scalia used a Bible verse to support a legal argument in
California v. Hodari D. In Hodari, a group of teenagers fled when a police car approached
them, and the police officers pursued. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1991).
California conceded that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to justify stopping
the suspects. Id. at 624 n.1. Justice Scalia argued, "That it would be unreasonable to stop, for
brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not
self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense. See Proverbs 28:1 ('The
wicked flee when no man pursueth')." Id. Justice Scalia then noted that the Court did not
decide this point, but relied on California's concession. Id. It would be interesting to see if
Justice Scalia's verse would withstand scrutiny under the Everson doctrine if it were used to
decide a point in a case.
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D. Two Down, One to Go-The Attack on the Conscience
Since courts could no longer use reason or Scripture to assess the law of
nature, there remained only one means of knowing the law of nature and
determining the legitimacy of the state's interests: the conscience. The
groundwork for the attack on the conscience began in Griswold v.
Connecticut, which established the constitutional right to privacy."
Griswold held that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."7 8
While Griswold held only that the right to privacy protected the sexual
conduct of married couples, the effect of Griswold established the idea that
one is free to do whatever he pleases as long as he does not harm anyone
else.so Justice O'Connor explained this position in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, stating, "At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life."8 ' This rationale set privacy jurisprudence
on an inevitable collision course with conscience-based jurisprudence.
The first clash82 of the two values occurred in Bowers v. Hardwick." In
Bowers, two men were convicted under a Georgia statute prohibiting
sodomy.84 The court of appeals found that the Georgia statute violated the
defendants' fundamental rights, drawing on Griswold.85 The Supreme Court
77. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
78. Id. at 484 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 485-86.
80. See 2 OTIs H. STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 386-87 (4th ed. 2008).
81. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
82. One could certainly argue that Roe v. Wade was the first major clash of privacy
jurisprudence and conscience jurisprudence. However, the rationale in Roe did not focus on
attacking morality but rather on balancing the privacy of the mother against the government
interests in protecting the mother's health and protecting the life of the child. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). While Roe certainly affected conscience-based jurisprudence,
the Court did not address any moral arguments in that opinion. It was not until Bowers that
the legitimacy of protecting morality was seriously challenged, and thus this Comment treats
Bowers as the first clash of conscience-based jurisprudence and privacy jurisprudence.
83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
84. Id. at 187-88.
85. Id. at 189.
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disagreed." In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the defendants' arguments
after conducting a fundamental rights analysis.87 The defendants, however,
claimed that there was not a rational basis for upholding the law merely
because Georgia's electorate thought that sodomy was immoral.8 In
response, Justice White wrote, "The law, however, is constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices
are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very
busy indeed."8 Chief Justice Burger concurred, citing the Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards90 as the standard for condemning this
particular act." Justice Stevens dissented, arguing "the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice . . . ."92 In support of his proposition, Justice Stevens wrote, "The
essential 'liberty' that animated the development of the law in cases like
Griswold ... surely embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual
conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral."93 Although Justice
Stevens lost the battle in Bowers, he eventually won the war." For a time,
Bowers held that upholding a law based on morality was a legitimate
function of the state. At that point, the Court still partially recognized the
law of nature as the basis for evaluating what a state can do, and
consequently, for determining whether a purported state interest was
legitimate.
The issue of conscience-based legislation presented itself to the Court
again seventeen years later in a 2003 case, Lawrence v. Texas."6 In Lawrence,
two men challenged a Texas statute that prohibited same-sex sodomy as
unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
86. Id. at 196.
87. Id. at 190-194 (showing that sodomy was not deeply rooted in our nation's
traditions).
88. Id. at 196.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 218.
94. See infra p.16 .
95. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
96. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Fourteenth Amendment." The Court reconsidered Bowers and overturned
it.98 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that same-sex sodomy was
not a fundamental right.99 After this, however, Justice Kennedy addressed
the moral issue by criticizing Bowers. He wrote:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in
Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries there
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as
immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect
for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial
concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical
and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus
determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not
answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on
the whole society through operation of the criminal law. "Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code."'o
Justice Kennedy concluded by saying that the rationale of Bowers did not
withstand careful analysis; rather, Justice Stevens's analysis"0' in Bowers
should have been controlling.0 2 Thus, the Court adopted Justice Stevens's
analysis and overruled Bowers.'0o Justice O'Connor concurred in the
judgment, stating, "Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate
government interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal
classifications must not be 'drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the
group burdened by the law."""o
97. Id. at 563.
98. Id. at 578.
99. Id. at 566-67 (arguing that the issue in Bowers was not whether there was a
fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
100. Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
101. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,216-18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Thus, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence was based on Equal Protection grounds, while Justice Kennedy's opinion was
based on Due Process grounds.
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In his dissent, Justice Scalia observed that the Court's standard of review
was ambiguous, but that it most closely resembled a rational basis review.'o
Under that standard of review, the Court must uphold the law if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.1" Because prohibiting same-
sex sodomy is rationally related to the objective of upholding morality, and
because the Court struck down the statute, Justice Scalia concluded that
Lawrence removed morality from the category of legitimate state
interests.'0
III. PROBLEM: THE ONLY STANDARD REMAINING FOR DETERMINING THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE'S INTERESTS IS JUDICIAL WILL
If Justice Scalia is correct, then Lawrence represents the final nail in the
coffin for the law of nature. Since the law of nature was the standard to
assess whether something was a legitimate state interest, then Lawrence
presents the significant problem of determining how legitimate state
interests are identified. Furthermore, who would decide whether something
is a legitimate state interest? In a post-Lawrence world, one answer is that
judges are able to read their own theories of government into a rational
basis review, and whatever they say will be the new standard for
determining what governments can and cannot do.
Fortunately, the federal circuit courts have interpreted Lawrence
narrowly until this point.' In 2010, however, the Northern District of
California interpreted Lawrence much more broadly by declaring that
morality is not a legitimate state interest and by redefining legitimate state
interests according to the judge's own legal theory.' If more courts
interpret Lawrence this way, then the courts will open the door to allowing
new legal theories to define what government can and cannot do. 0
105. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. See MASSEY, supra note 1, at 46.
107. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This effectively decrees the end of
all morals legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality
is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can survive rational-
basis review.").
108. See infra Part III.A.
109. See infra Part III.B.
110. See infra Part III.C.
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A. Federal Circuit Courts Interpreting Lawrence
The federal circuit courts have interpreted Lawrence narrowly. The
courts unanimously agree that Lawrence protects consensual, adult,
homosexual intercourse."' Nevertheless, the courts have had difficulty
determining what standard of review Lawrence demands and what rule
comes out of the case.1 12
The First Circuit in Cook v. Gates concluded that Lawrence applied a
heightened level of review between rational basis and intermediate
scrutiny."' The Cook Court interpreted Lawrence as holding that certain
private sex within the home is a liberty interest."' The First Circuit made
clear, however, that the Supreme Court did not remove morality from the
category of legitimate state interests but made a narrow holding regarding
this protected liberty interest.'15 This form of intermediate scrutiny was
essentially a balancing test-balancing public morals against government
intrusion." 6
The Ninth Circuit in Witt v. Department of the Air Force concluded that
Lawrence applied a heightened scrutiny test."' Interestingly, the Ninth
Circuit suggested that Lawrence was intentionally silent about the level of
scrutiny the Court applied."' Therefore, the Ninth Circuit analyzed
111. In explaining Lawrence, some of the courts distinguished Lawrence from the similar
moral-based statutes by holding that Lawrence only applied to adult homosexual conduct
instead of discussing how Lawrence affected morals-based statutes. United States v. Clark,
582 F.3d 607, 613-15 (5th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing consensual homosexual activity from
importing immigrants for "immoral purposes"); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th
Cir. 2005) (distinguishing homosexual sodomy from incest but establishing that Lawrence
did not create any fundamental right); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 868
n.3 (8th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Lawrence's holding under the Due Process Clause from
the plaintiffs' claim that denying homosexuals marriage violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
112. See, e.g., Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2008) (suggesting
that the Lawrence Court may have been intentionally ambiguous regarding what test should
apply).
113. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008).
114. Id. at 53.
115. Id. ("[Lawrence] can only be squared with the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of
morality as a rational basis by concluding that a protected liberty interest was at stake, and
therefore a rational basis for the law was not sufficient.").
116. Id. at 56.
117. Witt, 527 F.3d at 816.
118. Id. at 814.
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Lawrence "by considering what the Court actually did rather than by
dissecting isolated pieces of the text."ll9 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished Lawrence from this case by noting that protecting consensual
adult sodomy within the home was different than protecting it in the
military, because the government had a stronger interest in regulating
conduct in the military.120 Witt was the Ninth Circuit's case that interpreted
Lawrence until the Ninth Circuit decided Perry v. Brown, which is discussed
infra Part III.B.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Lofton v. Secretary of the
Department of Children and Family Services that Lawrence applied a
rational basis test.'2' This court found Lawrence's "legitimate state interest"
language controlling and also cited Justice Scalia's dissent in support.122
Furthermore, the court found that Lawrence's holding was limited to
"private consensual homosexual conduct."123 The court made clear that the
state has a "substantial government interest in protecting order and
morality."l24
Thus, the courts that have attempted to explain Lawrence have grappled
with whether Lawrence requires strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
rational basis review, or something else altogether. Though they were not in
full agreement, the federal circuit courts had this in common: they
acknowledged that Lawrence protected adult, consensual homosexual
sodomy, and none of them said that morality, under Lawrence, is not a
legitimate state interest.125 Therefore, they interpreted Lawrence narrowly.
119. Id. at 816.
120. Id. at 821.
121. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Serys., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir.
2004).
122. Id. at 817. It is also worth noting that this court held that Lawrence did not establish
a fundamental right to sexual privacy for two reasons: it lacked any inquiry regarding
whether the asserted right was deeply rooted in our nation's traditions, and instead of a
careful description that typically accompanies fundamental liberty analysis, it provided only
a "sweeping generality" regarding the asserted right. Id. at 816. The court considered whether
Lawrence created a fundamental right and demanded strict scrutiny.
123. Id. at 815.
124. Id. at 819 n.17 (citations omitted).
125. Interestingly, Lofton noted that there are certain "unprovable assumptions" that can
"nevertheless provide a legitimate basis for legislative action." Id at 819-20 n.17 (quoting
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62-63 (1973)). This quote from the Supreme
Court is evidence that judges must derive their standard for reviewing legitimate state
interests from somewhere. In 1973, Erie and Everson were already grounded in case law,
meaning that an unprovable assumption could not be legitimately proved either through
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As demonstrated above,'26 however, Lawrence has the capacity to be
interpreted much more broadly, to the point where morality is not a
legitimate state interest, and the presiding judge is free to decide whether
something is a legitimate state interest. Indeed, in 2010, the Northern
District of California interpreted Lawrence exactly that way.
B. Perry v. Schwarzenegger: Out with the Law of Nature, in with Law and
Economics
In 2010, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker of the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of California declared in Perry v. Schwarzenegger that a
state constitutional amendment defining marriage as one man and one
woman could not survive a rational basis test.127 In November 2008,
California voters passed a state constitutional amendment known as
Proposition 8, which defined marriage as between one man and one
woman.'28 In May 2009, two homosexual couples filed suit in federal court,
claiming that Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 129 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that
Proposition 8 violated their fundamental right to marry the person of one's
choice under the Due Process Clause.'30 Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed
that Proposition 8 violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause
because it discriminated against homosexuals."' Chief Judge Walker agreed
on both issues.
In addressing the due process issue, Chief Judge Walker found that there
was a fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause."'
observation of creation or through the Scriptures. Yet somehow, the judges knew that there
was some way of knowing what a legitimate state interest is. The Court's description of an
"unprovable assumption" fits very well within the framework described above for knowing
the law of nature under the prong of the conscience, or as Coke called it, the law of God
infused into the heart of man. See supra Parts II.A, II.D.
126. See supra Part II.D.
127. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *29 (9th
Cir. Feb. 7,2012).
128. Id. at 927.
129. Id. at 927, 929.
130. Id. at 929.
131. Id. at 929-30.
132. Id. at 991.
133. Id.
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Typically, the abridgement of a fundamental right requires a strict scrutiny
review.'" Nevertheless, Chief Judge Walker decided to give Proposition 8 a
rational basis examination."' Under a rational basis examination, a statute
survives a constitutional challenge if it is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest."' Chief Judge Walker, however, did not think that protecting
traditional marriage was a legitimate state interest."'3 In addressing this
issue, the judge wrote:
Proposition 8 cannot withstand any level of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause, as excluding same-sex couples from
marriage is simply not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. One example of a legitimate state interest in not issuing
marriage licenses to a particular group might be a scarcity of
marriage licenses or county officials to issue them. But marriage
licenses in California are not a limited commodity, and the
existence of 18,000 same-sex married couples in California shows
that the state has the resources to allow both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples to wed."'
Interestingly, Chief Judge Walker simply assumed that excluding same-sex
couples from marriage was not a legitimate state interest, but managing
limited commodities was.' 9 Nevertheless, the judge did not explain why
one goal was legitimate and the other was not. One may reasonably wonder,
then, how he came to his conclusion.
Chief Judge Walker is a law and economics theorist.o Law and
economics theorists believe that the law should do what makes the most
134. Id. at 994.
135. Id. at 997. Chief Judge Walker had also found homosexuals to be a suspect class
under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 996-97. Typically, if either a fundamental right
is being abridged or a suspect class is being targeted, strict scrutiny is invoked, which the
court admitted. Id. at 994, 997. According to the judge, both violations were present here. Id.
It is very odd that he then would engage in a rational basis review.
136. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
137. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Bob Egelko, Aaron Director - Profoundly Influential Law Professor, S.F. CHRON.
(Sept. 14, 2004), http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-09-14/bay-area/17444516-1_law-and-
economics-antitrust-aaron-director.
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economic sense.' 4 1 Because Chief Judge Walker was operating within this
framework, it is understandable that he would conclude that courts should
focus on commodities when considering government involvement with
marriage. Law and economics theory, however, is not-and never has
been-the standard for determining the legitimacy of state interests.'42 The
law of nature was.'4 ' But since Lawrence closed the door to the law of
nature, the judge was free to read his own theory of legitimate state interests
into the rational basis review. Specifically regarding morality, Chief Judge
Walker took the broader interpretation of Lawrence. At the end of his
opinion, Chief Judge Walker analogized Perry with Lawrence, citing
morality as the justification for the laws in both cases.'" Considering
whether morality could constitute a legitimate state interest, the judge
quoted Lawrence, saying, '[M]oral disapproval, without any other asserted
state interest,' has never been a rational basis for legislation." 45
The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed Perry on other, narrower grounds,
using a different equal protection argument than the one raised at trial.146
The court, however, expressly declined to answer the due process and equal
protection arguments that Chief Judge Walker raised in his opinion. 147
Since the appellate court did not disavow Chief Judge Walker's due process
and equal protection arguments from the district court, Chief Judge
Walker's analysis still serves as a valid example of how a judge could take a
broader view of Lawrence and judge the legitimacy of the state's interests by
his own theory-or will.14 1
141. See, e.g., ANDREW ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW 171 (2d ed. 2001) ("The evaluative
thesis of law and economics is ... that economic efficiency provides a criterion for evaluating
the law: other things being equal, inefficient legal rules should be replaced by efficient ones,
and efficient ones should be maintained.").
142. See supra Part II.
143. See supra Part II.
144. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
145. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)). It is worth noting that Justice O'Connor's comment was in the context of
disapproving of a group of people under an Equal Protection claim. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Ironically, Justice O'Connor assumed that protecting
traditional marriage was a legitimate state interest in that same concurrence. Id. at 585.
146. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *12, *14, *29 (9th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2012).
147. Id. at *12, *17.
148. It appears that the Ninth Circuit interpreted Lawrence broadly in Perry v. Brown,
thus departing from its narrow Lawrence analysis in Witt, discussed supra Part III.A. Citing
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C. The Future of Legitimate State Interests
Although the federal circuit courts have, to this point, interpreted
Lawrence narrowly, Chief Judge Walker capitalized on the opportunity that
Lawrence presented to push morality-and any law of nature
jurisprudence-out of the legitimate state interest category.' Additionally,
he filled the gap with his own idea of what a legitimate state interest should
be.'s If the courts adjust the standard for legitimate state interests, then the
government will have permission to address issues that were formerly
protected; conversely, issues the government could formerly address will no
longer be considered legitimate state interests. The legitimacy of state
interests will change depending on which jurisprudential theory is applied.
In Perry, Chief Judge Walker hints at how a law and economics paradigm
would affect the legitimate state interest standard."' Under a law and
economics model, efficiency is the chief virtue for determining how the law
should operate.'52 The problem is that an efficiency standard has the ability
to reduce the analysis to some kind of utilitarian calculus,s 3 which can
destroy the rights of the minority. Furthermore, as Perry demonstrates, a
law and economics standard has the potential to disregard what law of
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence, the Ninth Circuit said, "[Mioral disapproval of
a group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at *27 (quoting Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 582) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). It appears then that the Ninth Circuit
interpreted Lawrence to mean that protecting morality is not a legitimate state interest when
disapproving of a group, which is a broader interpretation of Lawrence than the Ninth
Circuit's analysis in Witt, discussed supra Part III.A, but a narrower interpretation than
Chief Judge Walker's analysis at the district court, which held that morality alone is not a
legitimate state interest at all. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. If this is true, then the Ninth
Circuit's new line between the legitimate state interest of protecting morality and the
illegitimate interest of moral disapproval of a group is not very clear. The lack of clarity is
shown by both the district court and the Ninth Circuit citing to Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Lawrence to justify striking down a marriage law, while Justice O'Connor's
concurrence itself stated that moral disapproval of a group is not a legitimate state interest
but preserving traditional marriage is a legitimate state interest. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582,
585 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
149. See supra Part III.B.
150. See supra Part III.B.
151. See supra Part III.B. For an excellent discussion of law and economics theory, see
ALTMAN, supra note 140, at 170-97.
152. ALTMAN, supra note 140, at 171.
153. Id. at 173.
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nature theorists traditionally regarded as absolute values-such as the
sanctity of marriage.
Another contender for the legitimate state interest standard is social
constructionism, also referred to as postmodernism."14 Professor Steven Gey
summarizes social constructionism-and its philosophy of government-in
this way:
Everyone in society is "constructed" by his or her society;
antisocial individual behavior will occur as a direct result of the
socialization that an individual experiences in his or her everyday
life; such behavior cannot effectively be controlled solely through
the application of disincentives or postbehavior punishments for
illegal action; therefore, factors contributing to individual
socialization must be subject to governmental control in order
for the government adequately to protect every citizen's full
participation in the society's social and political life."'
Consequently, if the government takes action to prevent negative
socialization, social constructionists consider that interest to be legitimate.
Taken to the extreme, this view would legitimize government actions that
have traditionally been prohibited by the First Amendment's guarantee of
free speech.1 6
Whatever the reigning paradigm, the problem is the same. Prior to
Lawrence, the law of nature was the standard for determining what
constituted a legitimate state interest. Post-Lawrence, however, judges
conducting a rational basis review have no guidance in determining
whether something is a legitimate state interest. If a judge cannot look to
the Scriptures, reason, or the conscience to determine what a legitimate
state interest is, then ultimately the standard will be whatever seems right to
the judge.
IV. SOLUTION: RESTORE THE LAW OF NATURE AS THE STANDARD FOR
ASSESSING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE'S INTERESTS
Lawrence creates a significant problem that demands a solution.
Allowing judges to do whatever is right in their own eyes is incompatible
154. See generally Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U.
PA. L. REV. 193 (1996).
155. Id. at 198.
156. Id. at 194-95.
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with the rule of law, since a republic, by definition, is "an Empire of Laws,
and not of men."'57 Therefore, there is only one solution: the law of nature
must again be recognized as the standard for determining whether
something is a legitimate state interest-notwithstanding any case law to
the contrary.
A. Restoring the Law ofNature as the Standard for Determining the
Legitimacy of State Interests
As established above, the law of nature can be known in three ways:
observation of creation through reason, the conscience, and the
Scriptures.' Restoring the law of nature as the standard for determining
legitimate state interests should begin by reversing Lawrence, which would
allow the law of nature to be understood through the conscience.'
Reversing Lawrence would be the easiest way to begin restoring the law of
nature standard because not much case law has developed from Lawrence,
whereas substantial case law has developed from Erie and Everson."'o
Reversing Lawrence would restore a Bowers analysis of conscience-based
laws, meaning that protecting morality would be a legitimate state
interest.''
One may object here, asking whose conscience is being used to evaluate
the law of nature: the judge's or the people's? Since the traditional view
holds that the law of nature is infused by God into the heart of man,162 and
since both judges and the people are man, the answer is both. The law of
nature itself is the standard, not the law of nature as evaluated by the judge
or the law of nature as evaluated by the people. Since it is vested in both the
people and the judges, it can be used by either to evaluate whether
157. JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT: APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE
AMERICAN COLONIES (1776), reprinted in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 87 (Robert J. Taylor et al.
eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1979).
158. See supra Part II.A.
159. See supra Part II.D.
160. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 (1965) (holding that a federal district court must
apply state law only when doing so likely results in forum-shopping based upon likelihood of
different result and the balancing of the interests of administration of federal and state laws
favors the state); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that, under Everson, a
teacher-led prayer in a public school violates the Establishment Clause); Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that, under Erie, federal district
courts must apply the conflict of law rules of the state where the district court is sitting).
161. See supra Part II.D.
162. See supra Part II.A.
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something is a legitimate state interest, the people in passing laws and
judges in reviewing them.
One may object again because of the potential for abuse. The people, in
the name of the conscience, may pass a law that abridges the rights of
another simply because they do not like what the other is doing. This kind
of legislation would be majoritarianism. Likewise, a judge, in the name of
the conscience, may declare a legitimate state interest to be illegitimate,
simply because he does not like it. That kind of judicial review would be
judicial activism. In both cases, a potential for abuse exists in assessing the
law of nature by means of the conscience alone. The question then is
whether there is another means of assessing the law of nature to check the
misuse of conscience-based laws.
Another means of assessing the law of nature, which can serve as a check
on the misuse of conscience-based laws, is observing creation through
reason.'63 The Founders assessed the law of nature this way in describing
the self-evident truths stated in the Declaration of Independence," and the
early American courts assessed the law of nature this way in applying
general principles of law to federal diversity cases. 6 s Reinstating this
method of assessing the law of nature may require reversing Erie. 66 One
may object again at the potential for abuse. If the people and a judge read
the law of nature differently, then who is right? As Blackstone observed,
And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his
transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions,
unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or intemperance,
the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other
163. See supra Part II.A-B.
164. See supra Part II.B. Note this does not mean that the Founders adopted the deistic
natural law view that man comes to these conclusions by reason alone. The term "law of
nature" used in the Declaration reflects the Anglo-American tradition as outlined in Part II,
supra, whereas the term "natural law" reflects the view that man can reason rightly without
Scripture. Cf Tuomala, supra note 25, at 315 n.95. Since the Declaration recognizes the law
of nature first before discussing self-evident truths, the reference to self-evident truths is put
in perspective and is not a reflection of the deistic natural law tradition.
165. See supra Part II.C.
166. Cf supra Part II.C. One may object that reversing Erie would present the problem of
having two governing laws within one state and that the lack of uniformity would lead to
forum shopping. This is a problem that cannot be solved within the scope of this Comment.
For a discussion of that issue, see Tuomala, supra note 25, at 314-25. Rather, this Comment
highlights the problems Erie presents for determining whether something is a legitimate state
interest.
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guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own
experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full
of ignorance and error.'16
The question then is whether there is another way to assess the law of
nature.
The third and epistemologically most superior way to assess the law of
nature is through the Scriptures.6 ' Thus, if both the people in passing laws
and judges in evaluating laws are striving to stay within the scope of
legitimate state interests, then they ought to know the Scriptures.6" One
may object that allowing judges to use the Scriptures for determining the
legitimacy of state interests would mean that judges get to decide what the
Scriptures mean. But that is not true. God is the final authority on what the
Scriptures mean, and each of us is responsible for following them as they
pertain to our respective spheres of authority. Another objection might be
that judges have the potential for misinterpreting what Scriptures say.
While that possibility exists, it also exists for everything else. Arguing that
we should not have Scriptures because we might misinterpret them is like
arguing that we should not have a written Constitution because we might
misinterpret it; it is an invalid objection. Furthermore, the Scriptures are a
transcendent standard. While judges may possibly misinterpret the
Scriptures, the standard still exists at a level where the judges cannot alter its
meaning. Additionally, since the Scriptures are accessible by the average
person, a gross misinterpretation of Scripture can be discovered by a
knowledgeable public, thus limiting the potential for abuse.
B. A Test for Determining Whether Something Is a Legitimate State Interest
The rational basis test requires that a law needs to be rationally related to
a legitimate state interest to be upheld.o While the judiciary has a test to
examine whether the means of achieving a legitimate state end is lawful-
i.e., whether the statute in question can accomplish a legitimate state goal-
the judiciary currently does not have a test to examine whether the end
167. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41.
168. See supra Part II.A-B.
169. One may object that using Scripture in making and evaluating law violates the wall
of separation of church and state. The way that the wall of separation has been interpreted
since Everson, however, is not the way that the First Amendment was originally meant to be
understood. See Dreisbach, supra note 73. To the extent that the wall of separation doctrine
is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, it should be overruled.
170. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631 (1996).
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itself-i.e. the government interest-is lawful. A test for determining
whether a purported state interest is legitimate must now be considered.
Typically, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, the law will be upheld so long as it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."' This standard of review is incredibly deferential,
and the burden is on the challenger to prove that the statute is
unconstitutional.'72 Because the rational basis test gives such a strong
presumption of validity to the law in question, it is logical to assume that
the end-the state interest being challenged-should have a strong
presumption of validity as well. Therefore, the court should place the
burden of proving that a state interest that has traditionally been considered
legitimate is illegitimate on the challenger.
The court should then analyze whether the government interest is
legitimate. First, the court should determine whether the purported
government interest is legitimate under the law of nature. If the law of
nature permits a government to perform the action in question, then the
analysis should continue; if not, then the statute should be struck down
because its objective is illegitimate.
Next, just because the law of nature permits a government to take a
certain action does not mean that the people have allowed their government
to take that action. The Declaration of Independence states that
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."
The implication, then, is that if the people have not surrendered a legitimate
power to their government, then the government may not exercise that
power. Thus, the next question is whether the relevant constitution permits
the government to take that action.
If the statute in question is a state law, then the court must ask whether
the state constitution allows the state government to take that action. If it
does not, then the statute must be struck down as having an illegitimate
objective. If it does, then the court must proceed to ask whether the statute
violates the Federal Constitution. If it does, then the statute must be struck
down as having an illegitimate objective. If it does not, then the government
objective is legitimate, and the statute should be struck down only if it is not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
If the statute in question is a federal law, then the court must ask whether
the Federal Constitution allows the government to take that action, i.e.,
171. Id.
172. MASSEY, supra note 1, at 46.
173. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2. (U.S. 1776).
[Vol. 6:415442
RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TO WHAT?
whether the federal government is acting pursuant to an enumerated power.
If it is not acting pursuant to an enumerated power, then the statute should
be struck down as having an illegitimate objective.'74 If it is acting pursuant
to an enumerated power, then the government objective is legitimate, and
the statute should be struck down only if it is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.
C. Examples
The following examples reconsider two Supreme Court cases in which
the legitimacy of a purported state interest was in question. These examples
walk through the test and examine whether the outcome of these cases
would have been different.
1. Preventing Hippie Communes-United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court held
that a federal law excluding from a food stamp program any household
containing an individual who was not related to the other members of the
household violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."' In Moreno, Congress enacted a food
stamp program to "alleviate hunger and malnutrition among the more
needy segments of our society,""' but eligibility to participate in the
program was determined "on a household rather than an individual
basis.""' The statute defined "household" to include "only groups of related
individuals,"' which consequently excluded households of non-related
individuals.'79
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, thought the statute was intended
to prevent hippies from participating in the program. 80 Justice Brennan
found this purported government interest to be illegitimate, writing, "[I]f
174. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. Since the powers not granted to the federal government
are reserved to the states and to the people, the federal government may only act pursuant to
an enumerated power. Thus, an action taken by the federal government that is not pursuant
to an enumerated power is illegitimate.
175. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 534.
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the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
government interest.""" The government argued that it had a legitimate
interest in preventing fraud and that disbursing food stamps among
traditional households would only discourage people from living together
for the sole purpose of qualifying for the program.1 2 Justice Brennan
determined that there was not a rational relationship between the
traditional household requirement and the objective of preventing fraud."
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented, arguing that
neither the end of preventing fraud nor the means of using traditional
family households were irrational when viewed "in the light most favorable
to sustaining the limitation. "1
The case presents two issues for analysis under the proposed test: (1)
whether a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group is a legitimate
state interest, and (2) whether the connection between the governmental
interest in preventing fraud and the statute was rational enough to sustain
it.
First, reason certainly suggests that the government cannot harm a group
merely because the group is unpopular. The Declaration of Independence,
for instance, says that it is a self-evident truth that we, are all created equal
and endowed by our Creator with certain inalienable rights.' If all men are
created equal, then it is illogical to treat one group as inferior just because it
is different. Second, the conscience confirms that the government cannot
harm a group merely for being different. Surely the Nazis' persecution of
the Jews, just for being Jews, shocks everyone's conscience enough to show
that harming a group merely because it is unpopular is wrong. Finally, the
Scriptures make clear that a government cannot harm a person or people
group without cause. Romans 13:1-7 makes clear that governments are
established by God"86 for the purposes of punishing those who do evil1 7 and
praising those who do good." Since governments exist to punish evil, the
181. Id.
182. Id. at 535.
183. Id. at 535-37.
184. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
185. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
186. Romans 13:2 (New American Standard)
187. Romans 13:3, 5.
188. Romans 13:3-4.
444 [Vol. 6:415
RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TO WHAT?
inference is that if there is no evil, or actus reus, then there is no
punishment. Thus, the government has no legitimate interest in harming
anyone if he or she has done no wrong.189 In conclusion, then, Justice
Brennan's assertion that "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest"'90 is
correct.191
The second issue is whether, as Justice Rehnquist asserted, the
connection between the government interest in preventing fraud and the
law's traditional household requirement was sufficient to survive a rational
basis review.'92 Under the rational basis review, the law in question is
supposed to be viewed "in the light most favorable to sustaining the
189. See 2 Samuel 21:1 (New American Standard) (recording God's act of punishing
Israel's government for harming an innocent minority group).
190. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
191. Note, however, that Justice Brennan is correct only because he says that harming a
group solely because it is not liked cannot be a legitimate state interest. While his statement is
correct, he ignores the fact that hippie communes may have been detrimental to the public
health because of their living conditions. The law presumes that protecting the public health
is a valid exercise of a state's police powers. The federalism issue aside, in this case, Justice
Brennan may have misunderstood Congress's end.
192. As a preliminary matter, the law-of-nature analysis calls into question the validity of
the government's involvement in welfare programs. Arguably, providing for the needy is the
end sought to be achieved. Nevertheless, the Scriptures say that the purpose of government is
to punish evil and to praise good. Romans 13:1-7 (New American Standard). On the other
hand, the Scriptures place the responsibility of providing for one on oneself first. See, e.g., 2
Thessalonians 3:10 (New American Standard) ("[I]f anyone is not willing to work, then he is
not to eat, either."). For the truly needy, however, the Scriptures place the responsibility of
providing first on the family and then on the church. See, e.g., James 1:27 (New American
Standard) ("Pure and undefiled religion in the sight of our God and Father is this: to visit
orphans and widows in their distress...."); I Timothy 5:3-16 (New American Standard)
(instructing family members to take care of the needy in their own family so that the church
can assist those who have nobody to assist them). Furthermore, even if the end is legitimate
under a law-of-nature analysis, the legitimacy of federal welfare programs also depends on a
broad interpretation of the General Welfare Clause of Article 1, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution. This author holds to the Madisonian view that the "General Welfare"
refers only to the enumerated powers listed in Article 1, Section 8. See United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (discussing the differences between the Madisonian and
Hamiltonian views). Tackling this behemoth-sized issue requires a thorough and careful law-
of-nature analysis and an equally thorough and careful analysis of the General Welfare
Clause and perhaps the Commerce Clause. This author thinks that the analysis would
ultimately show that the end is not a legitimate government interest, but suggests that the
topic be explored thoroughly in another law review article.
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limitation.""' Under this standard, the Court could have reasonably
concluded that the traditional household "provides a guarantee which is not
provided by households containing unrelated individuals that the
household exists for some purpose other than to collect federal food
stamps." 94 Thus, the statute should have been upheld.
In conclusion, although the statute should have been upheld, Justice
Brennan's conclusion that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular
group is not a legitimate state interest was correct.
2. Fostering Good Morals-City ofErie v. Pap's A.M.
In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., the Court upheld a city ordinance banning
public nudity as applied to a nude, erotic dancing establishment."' In Pap's,
the City of Erie enacted an ordinance that made it an offense to "knowingly
or intentionally appear in public in a 'state of nudity."'196 The ordinance
forced nude dancing establishments to require their dancers to wear certain
minimal clothing."' Pap's, a nude dancing establishment, challenged the
ordinance as unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.!9
A plurality of four, led by Justice O'Connor, upheld the ordinance. 1 The
Court found that nude dancing was expressive conduct and thus was
entitled to some constitutional protection.200 Nevertheless, the Court also
found that the ordinance was not aimed at the suppression of free
expression, but rather at the secondary effects of such expression, and thus
was a content-neutral regulation.2 0' Accordingly, the Court applied the
O'Brien test202 and upheld the ordinance.203 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
193. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
195. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282-83 (2000).
196. Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 284.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 283.
200. Id. at 289.
201. Id.
202. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
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Thomas, concurred in the judgment, arguing that since the ordinance was
"a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at
expression, it [was] not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all."204
Justice Scalia believed that the First Amendment is violated when "the
government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative
attributes."205 Thus, Justice Scalia concurred neither because nude dancing
communicated anything at all, 206 nor because of secondary effects,20 ' but
because "[t]he traditional power of government to foster good
morals... and the acceptability of the traditional judgment... that nude
public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by the First
Amendment." 208
Although he did not explicitly say so, it appears that Justice Scalia
thought fostering good morals was a legitimate state interest, and because
the First Amendment did not require a higher standard of scrutiny, the
Court should have given the ordinance a rational basis review. The first
issue, then, is whether fostering good morals is a legitimate state interest,
and the second is whether the First Amendment requires a higher level of
scrutiny in reviewing the ordinance.
First, reason suggests that fostering good morals certainly is a legitimate
state interest. On this point, Blackstone and the Founders reasoned that
since the world runs God's way and that virtue is to do things God's way,
then being virtuous is the most conducive means to man's happiness, which
is the objective of government.209 If this is true, then the government
certainly has a legitimate interest in fostering good morals. Second, the
conscience also suggests that fostering good morals is a legitimate
government interest. Justice Scalia observed this point in his Pap's
concurrence when he talked about "the traditional judgment ... that nude
public dancing itself is immoral."2 10 The phrase "traditional judgment"
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id.
203. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 296.
204. Id. at 307-08 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 310 (citations omitted).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See supra Part II.A-B.
210. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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shows that over time, the American people have held certain things to be
immoral and have called upon their governments to act on those
convictions. Thus, the conscience suggests that fostering good morals is a
legitimate state interest. Finally, the Scriptures say that the purpose of
government is to punish evil and to praise good.21' If this is true, then it
follows that fostering good morals is a legitimate state interest. Therefore,
after considering evidence from reason, the conscience, and the Scriptures,
the conclusion is that fostering good morals is a legitimate state interest.
The second issue is whether the First Amendment requires a higher
degree of scrutiny. The plurality in Pap's held that nude dancing is
expressive conduct although it falls "only within the outer ambit of the First
Amendment's protection."212 Justice Scalia, however, saw a distinction
between conduct that the government prohibits precisely because of its
communicative attributes and conduct that the government prohibits
because it is inherently immoral.213 The question then is whether the
drafters of the First Amendment intended to make that distinction.
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story took the position
that the purpose behind the First Amendment was not to protect
licentiousness.214 In his commentaries on the Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses, Justice Story repeatedly referred to freedom of the press
specifically," but the text indicates that he intended to give the same
analysis to freedom of speech.216 Thus, the reader can assume that the same
rationale that applies to freedom of the press applies also to freedom of
speech. Regarding the purpose of the First Amendment, Justice Story said,
211. Romans 13:3-4 (New American Standard).
For rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to
have no fear of authority? Do what is good and you will have praise from the
same; for it is a minister of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be
afraid; for it does not bear the sword for nothing; for it is a minister of God, an
avenger who brings wrath on the one who practices evil.
Id.; 1 Peter 2:14 (New American Standard) ("[Governors are] sent by [God] for the
punishment of evildoers and the praise of those who do right.").
212. Pap's, 529 U.S. at 289 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring).
214. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1878
(Fred B. Rothman Publ'ns 2nd prtg. 1999) (Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833).
215. See id. §§ 1874-85.
216. See id. § 1874 ("The next clause of the amendment respects the liberty of the press.
'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' (footnote
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)).
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It is plain, then, that the language of this amendment imports no
more, than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and
print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever ... so always,
that he does not injure any other person in his rights, person,
property, or reputation; and so always, that he does not thereby
disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government.
It is neither more nor less, than an expansion of the great
doctrine ... that every man shall be at liberty to publish what is
true, with good motives and for justifiable ends.217
Thus, it appears that the First Amendment attempted to protect expression
of opinions, but that expression must have been in pursuit of the truth, with
good motives, and for justifiable ends. Justice Story's position appears to
support Justice Scalia's position. If any doubt remains that the First
Amendment does not protect immorality, Justice Story, quoting Blackstone,
also said, "[T]o censure the licentiousness, is to maintain the liberty of the
press."218 Since Blackstone, whom our Founders revered,219 held that
licentiousness was not protected, and since Justice Story, an early expert on
constitutional matters, held that licentiousness was not protected, the
conclusion is that the First Amendment was not intended to protect
licentiousness, including nude dancing.
In conclusion, Justice Scalia's beliefs that protecting morality is a
legitimate state interest and that the First Amendment does not require
heightened scrutiny in discouraging nude dancing220 were correct. Thus, the
only question is whether there was a rational relationship between
protecting morality and banning public nudity. Because public nudity
subverts public morals,221 a rational relationship existed, and the Supreme
Court should have upheld the ordinance.
D. Anticipatory Rebuttals
At this point, one may still have objections to the proposed solution.
Three common objections may be: (1) that the law of nature analysis would
217. Id. (footnotes omitted).
218. Id. § 1878 (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*152-53).
219. See supra note 26.
220. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
221. See id
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allow a judge to disregard the Constitution whenever he feels like it; (2) that
the United States is no longer a Christian nation and thus the proposed
solution is unsuitable; and (3) that giving a judge the ability to assess the law
of nature is too much power for an independent judiciary to possess.
First, the law of nature does not give a judge extra-constitutional
authority to exercise his power over whatever issue he pleases. The key
question is one of jurisdiction-what authority has been granted to this
particular judge? As argued supra, the Founders presumed that sovereignty
flowed from God to the people to the government.2 22 Thus, the law of
nature placed the duty on the people to obey it,223 and the people vested
authority in their government to enforce it.2 24 Because the federal
government is a government of enumerated powers, 225 any power that the
Constitution does not grant to the federal government is reserved to the
states or to the people.' Therefore, the law of nature analysis is only
relevant to the powers that have been delegated to the respective
government.
For example, if abortion is murder and thus violates the law of nature,227
then a federal judge does not have jurisdiction over this issue merely
because it violates the law of nature. If abortion is murder, then the act is a
murder by a private individual. The law of nature places the burden on the
government to protect life.228 But since the power to prevent private
murders has not been granted to the federal government, the responsibility
of protecting unborn life remains with the states.229 Walking into a federal
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. See supra Part II.A-B.
224. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating that
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed).
225. See supra note 172.
226. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
227. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating that
governments exist to secure unalienable rights-one of which is life).
228. Id.
229. One could argue that the Fourteenth Amendment grants the federal government the
ability to protect life. Looking at the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause applies only to citizens, and both the Privileges and Immunities Clause
and the Due Process Clause apply when state governments, not private parties, cross
constitutional lines. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause, however,
forbids a state from denying equal protection of the laws to any person in its jurisdiction. Id.
Thus, one could argue that since every person in a state is protected against murder except
the unborn and since the unborn are persons, there is an equal protection violation;
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court expecting to find a remedy for any violation of the law of nature is like
walking into a tax court expecting to find a remedy for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. In both cases, the court does not have jurisdiction to
grant the remedy sought. Thus, the mere fact that the law of nature exists
and must be examined does not give a judge a blank check to do whatever
he pleases.
Second, one may object based on popular opinion, which states that the
United States is no longer a Christian nation, and thus the proposed
solution is unsuitable. First, the judiciary's role is not to gauge popular
opinion, but rather to interpret and apply the law, regardless of popular
opinion.230 In fact, the Constitution established the judiciary to be a check
against popular opinion in case the majority faction passed a law
inconsistent with the Constitution.231 Thus, the popular opinion argument
is invalid. But even if it were valid, the vast majority of Americans still
consider themselves Christians, 23 2 which makes it hard to believe that they
would reject a notion of God-given law.
Finally, one may object and hold that the federal judiciary already has too
much power 2" and the proposed solution would grant unchecked judges
the power to declare whether a purported state interest is legitimate, which
is more power than the judiciary should possess. A time may come when
the people agree and pass a constitutional amendment significantly limiting
judicial power or when the Court decides to restrain itself from determining
whether something is a legitimate state interest. But until then, the rational
basis test remains the same, and the judiciary needs a test to determine
whether a purported state interest is legitimate.2* If the standard for
measuring legitimacy is not the law of nature, it will be something else-
Congress has authority to remedy this violation under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
230. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
231. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
232. Frank Newport, Questions and Answers About Americans' Religion, GALLUP (Dec.
24, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/103459/questions-answers-about-americans-
religion.aspx#1 (noting that "[albout 82% of Americans in 2007 told Gallup interviewers that
they identified with a Christian religion").
233. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING
AMERICA 202 (Regnery Publ'g, Inc. 2005) (arguing that the judiciary has usurped too much
power and calling for a constitutional amendment allowing Congress to reverse Supreme
Court decisions).
234. See supra Part IV.B.
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whether law and economics,2 35  social constructionism, 236  Civil
libertarianism,237 or Just whatever the judge feels like it should be. A
republic that is an empire of laws and not of men"3 demands something
better-a lawful, just, and coherent standard. Since the law of nature is the
standard that the Constitution presupposes, 239 and since it is also true, it
must serve as the standard that guides the judiciary in assessing the
legitimacy of state interests.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court requires a law to be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest in a rational basis review, but the Court has never discussed
the standard for determining whether something is a legitimate state
interest. The law of nature was that standard. The legal giants of English
common law presupposed it. The Founding Fathers appealed to it in
declaring that the actions of the Crown were illegitimate. They were so
confident about this that they went to war against the most powerful empire
in the world in hopes that the Author of the law of nature would vindicate
their cause.240
But recent Court decisions have betrayed the standard that our Founders
presupposed. Erie rejected reason; Everson rejected revelation; Lawrence
rejected conviction. The rejection of these three means of knowing the law
of nature has now left judges without standards for determining whether
something is a legitimate state interest. While disciplined judges may stay
within the strict confines of precedent in attempting to construct some kind
of standard, others-such as the judge in Perry-may take this as an
opportunity to reshape the standard for determining whether something is
a legitimate state interest in their own image. The power to decide the
legitimacy of purported state interests is so important that it cannot be left
to ipse dixit.241 Therefore, a legal standard that settles the matter must be
recognized. That standard is-and always has been-the law of nature.
235. See supra Part III.C.
236. See supra Part III.C.
237. See supra Part II.D.
238. See ADAMS, supra note 155 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part II.A-B.
240. "We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General
Congress, Assembled, [appeal] to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our
intentions .... " THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776).
241. See supra note 16 (explaining ipse dixit).
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